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//2A-4/26/89 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
MUTUAL AID ASSOCIATION OF THE PAID FIRE 
DEPARTMENT OF THE CITY OF YONKERS, NEW 
YORK, INC., LOCAL 628, I.A.F.F., AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-10357 
CITY OF YONKERS, 
Respondent. 
DeSOYE & REICH, ESQS., for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exception of the Mutual Aid 
Association of the Paid Fire Department of the City of Yonkers, 
New York, Inc., Local 628, I.A.F.F., AFL-CIO (Local 628) to the 
dismissal, as deficient, of its improper practice charge against 
the City of Yonkers (City). The charge alleges that the City 
violated §§209-a.1(a), (c) and (d) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) when, after submitting an amended response 
to Local 628's amended petition for compulsory interest 
arbitration, the City reneged upon and withdrew the salary 
proposal contained in its amended response. 
The Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Director) dismissed the charge upon the ground 
that because an interest arbitration panel had been established 
pursuant to §2 09.4 of the Act, PERB lacks jurisdiction over 
actions which might otherwise give rise to improper practice 
Board - U-10357 
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charges. In so finding, the Director relied upon language 
contained in this Board's decision in Fairview Professional 
Firefighters Association, Inc., 13 PERB ^3102 (1980). That case 
addressed allegations of improper ex parte communication 
attempted by a party with the chair of the interest arbitration 
panel convened by this Board pursuant to §209.4 of the Act. We 
there held that the allegations of the improper practice charge 
were appropriately under the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
arbitration panel, since they related to conduct during the 
course of the arbitration proceedings. 1/ 
The Fairview decision, supra, is properly construed as 
holding, not that we lack jurisdiction over improper practice 
charges arising after a public interest arbitration panel has 
been convened, but that, as a general proposition, the conduct of 
parties before the arbitration panel is appropriately subject to 
the jurisdiction of the arbitration panel pursuant to Rules 
§205.8. This does not mean that this Board lacks jurisdiction 
in all respects over improper practice charges during the 
arbitration process. In fact, PERB's jurisdiction to hear and 
decide improper practice charges, pursuant to §2 05.5(d) of the 
Act, is exclusive and nondelegable. Indeed, in City of 
-^/section 2 05.8 of PERB's Rules of Procedure (Rules) 
provides: "§205.8 Conduct of the Arbitration Proceeding. The 
conduct of the arbitration panel [sic] shall be under the 
exclusive jurisdiction and control of the arbitration panel. The 
conduct of the arbitration panel shall conform to the applicable 
laws." 
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Binghamton, 9 PERB 5(3072 (1976) , jurisdiction was found to exist 
under circumstances substantially similar to the facts in this 
case. In that case, an employee organization filed a petition 
for interest arbitration which contained a salary demand lower 
than that which it had previously presented to the employer and 
to the fact finder. The City filed an improper practice charge 
alleging a violation of §209-a.2(b) of the Act, over which we 
exercised jurisdiction, and as to which we found a violation, 
based upon the employee organization's failure to communicate 
concessions to the employer which it was prepared to make, 
thereby frustrating the possibility of agreement prior to 
arbitration. Whether, as in City of Binghamton, supra, a party 
failed to communicate a concession, or whether, as here, a party 
has failed to communicate withdrawal of an offer, prior to 
interest arbitration, our jurisdiction to herein decide the case 
remains the same. 
We accordingly reverse the dismissal of the charge and 
remand it to the Director for further proceedings not 
inconsistent herewith. 
DATED: April 26, 1989 
Albany, New York 
I>X^2 \z. HSUJh-^ 
H a r o l d R. Newman, Chairman 
ItU^c^ Tf. 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CSEA, INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
BROOME COUNTY UNIT 6150, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-9 641 
COUNTY OF BROOME, 
Respondent. 
JOHN E. MURRAY, ESQ. (HARVEY D. MERVIS, ESQ., of 
Counsel), for Respondent 
NANCY HOFFMAN, ESQ. (JOSEPH E. O'DONNELL, ESQ., of 
Counsel), for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
) The County of Broome (County) has filed exceptions to an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) decision which holds that as 
charged by CSEA, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Broome 
County Unit 6150 (CSEA), the County violated §209-a.l(d) of 
the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it 
unilaterally eliminated three full-time ward clerk positions 
and replaced them with six part-time ward clerk positions at 
the County's Willow Point Nursing Home. The ALJ found, 
based upon a stipulated record, that when the County 
eliminated the three full-time ward clerk positions and 
replaced them with six part-time positions, it equally 
distributed among the part-time positions the hours of work 
and work assignments of the employees in the full-time 
Board - U-9641 
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positions. No change accordingly took place in the hours or 
level of service provided by ward clerks at the facility. 
In its exceptions, the County asserts that the ALJ erred 
in failing to find that the parties' collective bargaining 
agreement authorizes the County, or reserves to it the right, 
to eliminate full-time positions and create part-time 
positions. The County thus argues that CSEA either 
negotiated, or waived the right to negotiate, concerning the 
County's at-issue actions and that in either event, its 
actions were not taken without negotiation. 
The County's second exception relates to the portion of 
the remedial order issued by the ALJ which directs the 
payment of back pay to unit employee Evelyn Bezuskho. The 
County asserts that the record establishes not only that 
Bezuskho accepted a position as a part-time ward clerk, but 
that she was offered a full-time position similar to the ward 
clerk position she had held prior to the elimination of the 
full-time ward clerk positions by the County, and that an 
award of back pay for the difference between full-time and 
part-time ward clerk duties is accordingly inappropriate. 
In support of its first exception, the County points to 
Articles 3 and 18 of its collective bargaining agreement with 
CSEA. Article 3 (entitled "Reciprocal Rights") contains 
general statements of management rights, including the 
following: 
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CSEA recognizes the right of the Public Employer to 
retain and reserve unto itself all rights, powers, 
authority, duties and responsibilities conferred upon 
and vested in it by the Laws and Constitution of the 
State of New York and/or the United States of America. 
The exercise of these rights, powers, authority, duties 
and responsibilities by the Public Employer and the 
adoption of such rules, regulations and policies as it 
may deem necessary will, as they apply to the employees 
-----------^^ 
limited only by the specific and express terms of this 
Agreement. It is understood by the parties hereto that 
some portions of the County operations are comparatively 
small and scattered, and that several different kinds of 
work are performed, in many cases, by the same person; 
and that reasonable flexibility in interpreting the 
provisions of this Agreement is applied, so that the 
Public Employer can meet the requirements of its special 
operating conditions. It is mutually understood and 
agreed by both parties to this Agreement that the 
management of the County operation and the direction of 
the working forces, including the right to determine 
standards of service to be offered by various agencies 
and to regulate work schedules, to hire, suspend, 
discharge for proper cause, promote, demote and transfer 
) and other rights to relieve employees from duty because 
of lack of work or for other proper and legitimate 
reasons is vested and reserved in the Public Employer, 
subject to the limitations provided in the Law and this 
Agreement. 
The County argues that this statement of management 
rights entitles it to both eliminate positions and create 
positions, and that its substitution of six part-time 
employees for three full-time employees is nothing more than 
the exercise of each of these rights in sequence. 
Article 18 of the Agreement (entitled "Basic Work Week") 
contains numerous provisions relating to the work schedules 
of full-time employees. Notwithstanding the County's claim 
that Article 18 authorizes it to "set working hours", we read 
Article 18 as establishing certain limits within which the 
Board - U-9641 
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County may alter working hours. In any event, we find that 
the asserted right of the County to create part-time 
positions and to establish working hours for such positions 
is not dispositive of the matter before us. What is before 
us is whether the County may, without collective bargaining, 
convert three full-time positions to six half-time positions 
at the same level of service and hours of work. We agree 
with the ALJ's finding that it may not. In so finding, we 
reject the County's contention that any of the cited articles 
of the collective bargaining agreement establish that the 
parties have already engaged in negotiation on this subject, 
or that CSEA waived its right to negotiate concerning the 
subject.-^/ This is so because, although the County may have 
the right to curtail service and to lay off employees,-2/ and 
to make a determination to create part-time positions, it 
does not follow that it has the right to merely substitute 
part-time employees for full-time employees where there is no 
change in the level or nature of services being provided. It 
is this substitution which is challenged by CSEA and which we 
find constitutes a mandatory subject of bargaining. There 
being no claim that the parties specifically agreed that the 
1/A waiver of the right to negotiate must be "clear, 
unmistakable and without ambiguity". CSEA v. Newman, 88 
A.D.2d 685, 15 PERB 17011, at 7022 (3d Dep't 1982). Thus, 
general management rights clauses have been found by us not 
to give rise to a waiver of the right to negotiate. Cf. 
Sachem CSD, 21 PERB H3021 (1988). 
2/s_ee, e.g. , Lackawanna CSD, 13 PERB [^3085 (1980) . 
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County may substitute two part-time employees for each full-
time employee in the bargaining unit represented by CSEA, or 
that CSEA waived the right to negotiate concerning such 
action, the ALJ's finding that the County violated 
§209-a.l(d) of the Act is affirmed. 
In support of its claim that back pay for Evelyn 
Bezuskho was improperly granted, the County relies primarily 
upon its answer which provides, in relevant part, as follows: 
C. CSEA requested the opportunity to have the 
incumbents work other half-time positions or 
transfer to other full-time positions. This 
request was honored, and would satisfy any 
negotiation necessary. (The necessity is 
questionable per points A and B.) 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the parties stipulated as 
follows: 
Of the three full-time ward clerks, one 
employee was on maternity leave at the time of 
the change and was offered either another 
full-time position at the same grade, or a 
part-time ward clerk position. This employee 
never returned to work. A second employee, 
Evelyn Bezuskho accepted a position as a part-
time ward clerk. A third employee resigned 
prior to the change. 
The ALJ concluded, from the omission from the parties' 
stipulation of a statement that Evelyn Bezuskho was, like the 
employee on maternity leave, offered another full-time 
position with the County, that no such full-time position was 
offered and directed back pay for the difference between the 
part-time position she accepted and the full-time position 
which was eliminated. 
Board - U-9641 
Notwithstanding the County's contention, the record 
before us fails to establish that Bezuskho was offered and 
rejected full-time employment substantially equivalent to her 
full-time ward clerk position, as must be established if back 
pay liability is to be avoided.-^/ However, neither the 
"Details of Charge" of the improper practice charge form nor 
Part 2 04 of our Rules of Procedure requires the parties to 
factually plead or even to identify the relief alleged to be 
appropriate in the event of a finding of a violation. 
Furthermore, during the course of our improper practice 
proceedings we do not encourage lengthy litigation on 
questions of damages and mitigation thereof.4/ While the 
stipulation cannot be read as establishing that the County 
made an offer, it need not be read as establishing that such, 
in fact, did not occur. Because of this ambiguity and the 
other aforementioned factors, we deem it appropriate to 
afford the parties an opportunity to present evidence on the 
question of entitlement of monetary relief to Bezuskho. We 
I/See, e.g., Spencer-Van Etten CSD. 21 PERB ^3015 , (1988); 
Hilton CSD, 14 PERB f3038 (1981). 
4/See Uniondale UFSD. 21 PERB J[3044 (1988) . In most cases, 
it is unnecessary to litigate the nature and scope of relief 
because the appropriate relief is apparent from the scope of 
the violation found. In any event, we have historically 
encouraged litigants to focus on the merits of their cases 
before us, leaving the issue of remedy to the assigned ALJ, 
or in those unusual circumstances in which a dispute exists, 
as here, concerning the appropriate relief, bifurcating the 
proceedings. In this manner, litigation concerning relief is 
limited to those cases in which it is, in fact, necessary. 
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accordingly remand this matter to the assigned ALJ for the 
limited purpose of determining whether full-time employment 
was offered to Bezuskho which was substantially equivalent to 
the full-time ward clerk position she had held prior to her 
acceptance of a part-time ward clerk position. 
With the exception of the remand of this matter for the 
limited purpose of determining the appropriateness of back 
pay relief, the decision of the ALJ is affirmed. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the County: 
1. Restore the three full-time ward clerk positions, 
as they existed prior to their elimination on 
June 2, 1987. 
2. Make Evelyn Bezuskho whole for any loss of salary 
or benefits occasioned by the elimination of her 
full-time position with interest on any sum owing 
at the maximum legal rate calculated from June 2, 
1987, unless she was offered and rejected full-time 
employment substantially equivalent to her full-
time ward clerk position. 
3. Offer reinstatement as full-time ward clerks with 
full benefits to those employees in the positions 
prior to June 2, 1987. 
4. Negotiate in good faith with CSEA with respect to 
terms and conditions of employment of unit 
employees. 
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5. Post notice in the form attached in each location 
ordinarily used to post notices of interest to unit 
employees. 
DATED: April 26, 1989 
Albany, New York 
T^?^/£A/^ 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
APPENDIX 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYE 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
JPJJBLLC„EMgLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify t h e County of Broome t o : 
1. Restore the three full-time ward clerk positions, as 
they existed prior to their elimination on June 2, 
1987, 
2„ Make Evelyn Bezuskho whole for any loss of salary 
or benefits occasioned by the elimination of her full-
time position, with interest on any sum owing at the 
maximum legal rate calculated from June 2, 1987, 
unless she was offered and rejected full-time 
employment substantially equivalent to her full-time 
ward clerk position. 
3. Offer reinstatement as full-time ward clerks with 
full benefits to those emnloye.es in the positions prior 
to June 2, 1987= 
4. Negotiate in good faith with CSEA with respect to terms 
and conditions of employment of unit employees„ 




) This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
JOHN THOMAS MC ANDREW, 
Charging Party, 
U-10147 
PORT JERVIS TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, 
Respondent. 
JOHN THOMAS MC ANDREW, pro se 
ROBERT KLEIN, for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
We have before us exceptions to the dismissal of two 
improper practice charges filed by John Thomas McAndrew against 
the Port Jervis Teachers Association (Association). These 
matters have been consolidated at the request of McAndrew 
because, although issued by two different Administrative Law 
Judges (ALJs), the decisions were reached upon the same ground. 
Case No. U-9913 alleges a violation of §209-a.2(a) of the 
Public Employees1 Fair Employment Act (Act) by the Association 
arising out of the alleged refusal of the Association to 
process, upon the ground of untimeliness, a contract grievance 
on McAndrew's behalf concerning the denial of 1987 sabbatical 
leaves by McAndrew's employer, the Port Jervis City School 
District. The second charge, Case No. U-10147, also alleges a 
violation of §209-a.2(a) of the Act by the Association based 
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upon the Association's filing of its own contract grievance, 
which sought to reverse a paid sabbatical leave for 1988, 
granted to McAndrew by the employer. 
These matters were scheduled for hearing before different 
ALJs The record establishes that both ALJs made significant 
efforts to accommodate the wishes of the parties in connection 
with the scheduling of hearing days, and that hearing days were 
ultimately scheduled without objection of the parties. The 
record further establishes that McAndrew informed both ALJs that 
his employer had denied him leave with pay to attend the 
hearings and expressed his intention not to appear at hearings 
unless and until the issue of his entitlement to leave with pay 
'•\ for such hearing dates had been resolved. Finally, the record 
establishes that McAndrew chose not to apply to his employer for 
leave without pay, and that if requested, such leave would have 
been granted, so that his attendance at the scheduled hearings 
before the assigned ALJs would not have been on a paid leave 
basis, but would nevertheless have been authorized and would not 
have subjected him to disciplinary action for insubordination or 
absence without authorization. It is undisputed that McAndrew 
believes the denial of leave with pay by his employer is 
violative of his rights under the collective bargaining 
agreement between the Association and the employer and that 
contractual and possibly other remedies for the denial of leave 
with pay were available to McAndrew and have been pursued by 
him. 
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In separate decisions, dated December 8, 1988 and 
December 6, 1988 respectively, Case Nos. U-9913 and U-10147 were 
dismissed, after notice and direction to appear, for McAndrew's 
continued failure to appear and prosecute his charge pursuant to 
§2 04.7(b) of the Rules of Procedure (Rules) 
McAndrew excepts to the dismissal of his charges, asserting 
that the employer's denial of leave with pay to attend the 
hearings scheduled in these matters violated his contractual and 
other rights, and that his attendance at the hearings would have 
jeopardized his employment, a risk he should not have been 
compelled to take. As to the former contention, McAndrew's 
remedy was to file claims against his employer, which he has 
done.-2-/ However, even if McAndrew is correct in his contention 
that the employer's denial of leave with pay was improper, his 
•^/section 204.7(b) Rules provides as follows: 
The hearing will not be adjourned unless good and 
sufficient grounds are established by the 
requesting party, who shall submit to the 
administrative law judge an original and four 
copies of the application, on notice to all other 
parties, setting forth the factual circumstances 
of the application and the previously ascertained 
position of the other parties to the application. 
The failure of a party to appear at the hearing 
may, in the discretion of the designated 
administrative law judge, constitute ground for 
dismissal of the absent party's pleading. 
•^McAndrew asserts in his exceptions that the Association has 
filed a contract grievance on his behalf challenging the 
employer's failure to grant him leave with pay for his 
attendance at the hearings in these matters, and he has filed an 
improper practice charge against his employer in relation to 
these incidents, which is now pending. 
Board - U-9913 & U-10147 
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) 
remedy is receipt of back pay for days taken without pay; it is 
not to fail and refuse to appear at scheduled hearings on dates 
previously established with the parties. 
Notwithstanding McAndrew's second contention in support of 
his exceptions, the record simply does not support his claim 
that he was in jeopardy with respect to his employment, or would 
have been risking disciplinary charges for his attendance at 
PERB hearings. The sole basis asserted by McAndrew to the 
assigned ALJs before whom hearings were scheduled for his 
failure to appear was that he wished to be assured of payment 
for his absences from work before he would commit himself to 
attending hearings. The record adequately establishes that 
\ McAndrew would have received, if he had requested it, leave 
without pay, authorizing him to attend the PERB hearings. We 
concur with the findings of the ALJs that McAndrew's dispute 
with his employer concerning payment for the days in question 
does not constitute an adequate justification for his failure to 
appear and prosecute his charges after he was informed that the . 
consequence of his failure to appear might be dismissal of the 
charges. Certainly, a different result might have followed if 
McAndrew's employment would in fact have been jeopardized by his 
attendance at the hearings. However, such a risk has not been 
established in this case. 
Board - U-9913 & U-10147 
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Based upon the foregoing, the dismissals of the charges in 
Case No. U-9913 and Case No. U-10147 are hereby affirmed, and 
the charges are dismissed in their entirety. 
DATED: April 26, 1989 
(t&'tS-TOU*1*-
arold R. Newman, Chairman 
hut*-?. 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
#20-4/26/8? 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
JOSEPH S. JUSZCZAK, 
Charging Party, 
CSEA, INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
LOCAL 815 
Respondent. 
JOSEPH JUSZCZAK, pro se 
NANCY HOFFMAN, ESQ. (JEROME LEFKOWITZ, ESQ., of 
Counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
In a letter dated December 13, 1988 to the Director of 
Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director), 
Joseph Juszczak commented upon a decision issued on 
November 17, 1988 by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) which 
dismissed a charge filed by Juszczak against the CSEA, Inc., 
Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Local 815 (CSEA) alleging a 
violation of §209-a.2(a) of the Public Employees1 Fair 
Employment Act (Act). Juszczak alleged in his charge that 
CSEA breached its duty of fair representation either by 
failing to challenge his employer's payment, in 1980 and 
1981, of 50 cents per hour more than the contractual rate for 
work performed by a unit employee on a special project and/or 
for failing to process a grievance filed by him in 1987, 
Board - U-9798 
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following his discovery of the employer's alleged 1980-81 
overpayment. The ALJ dismissed the charge on its merits, 
finding that the employee receiving the additional 50 cents 
per hour in 1980-81 did so for the performance of foreman 
duties on the project, that the arrangement had not been made 
in secret and that the hearing failed to disclose evidence of 
improper motivation by CSEA in its failure to process 
Juszczak's grievance, filed six years later,-3=/ as untimely.—/ 
CSEA has raised a threshhold question before us, in the 
form of a motion to dismiss, whether Juszczak has filed 
exceptions to the ALJ decision in compliance with PERB's 
Rules of Procedure (Rules). Our Rules require that 
exceptions be filed with the Board within 15 working days 
after receipt of the ALJ's decision and recommended order, 
together with proof of service of a copy of such exceptions 
and brief upon all other parties (Rules §204.10[a]). 
Juszczak's purported exceptions were filed with the Director, 
rather than with the Board, were not accompanied by proof of 
service of a copy upon CSEA, do not appear in fact to have 
been timely served upon CSEA, do not conform to the 
i/lhe parties' collective bargaining agreement requires 
the filing of a contract grievance within ten days after the 
occurence complained of. 
•^ /in his submission, Juszczak questions the appropriate-
ness of CSEA's failure to prevent or stop the alleged overpayment 
in 198 0-81 when CSEA was aware of it. However, this issue was 
not before the ALJ and in light of our holding, it is neither 
necessary nor appropriate for us to address it. 
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requirements of Rules §204 .10 (b) ,-3-/ and appears not to have 
been filed with the Director within 15 working days following 
receipt of the ALJ decision. Recognizing that Juszczak's 
appearance before the ALJ and this Board is pro se and that 
some latitude in meeting the requirements of our Rules was 
warranted, he was given the opportunity to establish 
compliance with the timeliness and service requirements of 
our Rules and directed, by letter dated December 29, 1988, to 
provide to the Board, within five working days an affidavit 
setting forth the date of receipt of the ALJ decision and the 
date of service of a copy of the letter of exceptions upon 
CSEA. 
Juszczak has failed to produce the information requested 
by this Board, and has otherwise failed to respond to CSEA's 
motion to dismiss. In view of the apparent untimeliness of 
the exceptions, and their other deficiencies, and in view of 
Juszczak's failure to even proffer requested evidence 
-2/section 2 04.10(b) of the Rules provides as follows: 
The exceptions shall: (1) set forth specifically 
the questions of procedure, fact, law, or policy 
to which exceptions are taken; (2) identify that 
part of the administrative law judge's decision 
and recommended order to which objection is made; 
(3) designate by page citation the portions of the 
record relied upon; and (4) state the grounds for 
exceptions. An exception to a ruling, finding, 
conclusion or recommendation which is not 
specifically urged is waived. 
Board - U-9798 
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sufficient to establish the timeliness of the exceptions, the 
exceptions are hereby dismissed. 
4/ 
DATED: April 26, 1989 
Albany, New York 
>ld R. Newman, Chairman 
PUMz~ ¥ 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Memberi 
1/ 
Section 204.14(b) of the Rules provides that, in the 
absence of a timely exception, the decision below "will be 
final". 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
JOHN THOMAS McANDREW, 
Charging Party, 
PORT JERVIS CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
JOHN THOMAS McANDREW, pro se 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
John Thomas McAndrew excepts to the decision of the 
Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation 
(Director), dismissing, as deficient, his improper practice 
charge which alleges that the Port Jervis City School 
District (District) violated §209-a.l(a) of the Public 
Employees1 Fair Employment Act (Act) by entering into a 
"secretly negotiated memorandum" with his bargaining agent, 
the Port Jervis Teachers Association (PJTA). 
In particular, McAndrew alleges that while his contract 
grievance concerning denial of a summer 1987 sabbatical leave 
was pending, the District and the PJTA improperly executed a 
memorandum entitled "Clarification Concerning Sabbatical 
Leaves". McAndrew objects to the portion of the 
clarification memorandum which provides as follows: 
Board - U-10494 -2 
I trust that these clarifications address 
and are satisfactory replies to your 
concerns as expressed in grievances 401, 
410 and any similar PJTA grievances. As 
such, your agreement to withdraw the 
above arbitration requests is acceptable 
and is appreciated. 
--------^^ 
(numbered 416) was deemed settled as a result of execution of 
this memorandum, and that he was thus deprived of the 
opportunity to participate in a Stage III Board of Education 
hearing pursuant to the District's collective bargaining 
agreement with the PJTA. 
In addition to these claims, however, McAndrew asserts 
that his grievance was dismissed at Stage II as untimely, 
that he withdrew his request for a Stage III hearing before 
the Board of Education upon the ground that it had not been 
timely scheduled, and that the PJTA rejected his request that 
his grievance be processed to stage IV (arbitration), not 
because his grievance was deemed settled, but because it was 
found by the PJTA to be untimely. 
The Director's dismissal of the charge is based upon the 
failure to set forth facts therein which, if proven, would 
establish a prima facie claim of violation of the Act. In so 
finding, the Director determined that McAndrew's assertion 
that the District might apply the clarification memorandum to 
his case, deeming it settled, was speculative at best, and 
that no improper motivation, nor any factual support 
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therefor, was alleged for the District's conduct in entering 
into the clarification memorandum. 
Based upon these factors, together with McAndrew's other 
assertions that he withdrew his request for a Stage III 
-hea-rAng=a:nd=tha-t=h±s=^ 
untimeliness rather than settlement, the decision of the 
Director dismissing the charge should be affirmed. IT IS 
HEREBY ORDERED that the charge be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed in its entirety. 
DATED: April 26, 1989 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CSEA, INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and-
STATE OF NEW YORK - UNIFIED COURT 
SYSTEM, 
Employer. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, ESQ. (PAMELA NORRIX-TURNER, ESQ., 
of Counsel), for Petitioner 
HOWARD A. RUBENSTEIN, ESQ. (LEONARD R. KERSHAW, 
ESQ., of Counsel), for Employer 
) 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the CSEA, 
Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (Petitioner) and cross-
exceptions of the State of New York - Unified Court System 
(Employer) to a decision of the Director of Public Employment 
Practices and Representation (Director) which dismissed nine 
petitions filed by CSEA seeking to add the currently 
unrepresented title of Family Court Hearing Examiner (Examiner) 
to existing negotiating units of nonjudicial employees for 
which it is the authorized bargaining agent. 
CASE NOS. C-3276, 
C-3277, C-3278, 
C^ 3-27-9-,-—C=3 -2-8-0-, -
C-3281, C-3282, 
C-3283, C-3284 
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The Director based his dismissal of the petitions upon an 
advisory opinion issued by the Employer's Advisory Committee on 
Judicial Ethics (Opinion 88-44) which determined that 
Examiners, although nonjudicial employees, are subject to the 
Code of Judicial Conduct and, in particular, Canon 7 thereof. 1/ 
According to the Opinion, Canon 7 prohibits covered persons 
-1/canon 7 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides, in 
general, that a judge should refrain from political activity 
inappropriate to his judicial office, and in this regard 
prohibits the following: 
A. Political Conduct In General 
(1) A judge or a candidate for election to a 
judicial office should not: 
(a) act as a leader or hold any office in 
a political organization; 
(b) make speeches for a political 
organization or candidate or publicly 
endorse a candidate for public office; 
(c) solicit funds for or pay an assessment 
or make a contribution to a political 
organization or candidate, attend political 
gatherings, or purchase tickets for 
political party dinners, or other 
functions, except as authorized in 
subsection A(2); 
(2) The judge holding an office filled by 
public election between competing candidates, or 
a candidate for such office, may, only insofar 
as permitted by law, attend political 
gatherings, speak to such gatherings on his own 
behalf when he is a candidate for election or 
reelection, identify himself as a member of a 
political party, and contribute to a political 
party or organization . . . . 
(4) A judge should not engage in any other 
political activity except on behalf of measures 
to improve the law, the legal system, or the 
administration of justice. (Code of Judicial 
Conduct Canon 7). 
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from joining or participating in-2/ an organization which 
engages in political activity, that the petitioner is such an 
organization, and that Family Court Hearing Examiners are 
accordingly prohibited by Canon 7 of the Code of Judicial 
Conduct from joining, or being represented by, the petitioner. 
Section 201.7(a) of the Act excludes from the definition 
of public employee "judges and justices of the unified court 
system", among others. However, it is conceded by both parties 
that Family Court Hearing Examiners are nonjudicial employees 
and do not fall within this statutory exclusion from the Act's 
coverage. It is also undisputed that at the time the 
Legislature established the position of Family Court Hearing 
Examiner by enactment of Chapter 809, §14 of the Laws of 1985, 
it failed to add the position to the list of positions excluded 
from the Act's coverage. Furthermore, although the Employer 
cross-excepts to the Director's finding that no significant 
difference exists between the terms and conditions of 
employment of Family Court Hearing Examiners and others in the 
negotiating units to which the Petitioner seeks their addition, 
•^Although Canon 7 is framed in terms of a judge's 
personal/individual engagement in political activity, the 
Advisory Committee opinion appears to construe the Canon as 
prohibiting membership in an organization which engages in 
political activity, even if the judge does not personally 
participate in the organization's political activity. It is 
unclear whether, for example, a judge is prohibited by this 
interpretation from being a member of a political party, which 
obviously engages in political activity, although he or she 
does not personally engage in such activity. 
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the Employer does not appear to take the position that the 
differences identified by it between the Examiners and other 
bargaining unit personnel constitute a basis for the 
exclusion of Examiners from the units asserted by the 
Petitioner to be appropriate.-3-/ The employer asserts two 
significant differences between unit personnel and 
examiners. First is that Examiners are the only nonjudicial 
employees having authority to hear and decide matters which 
are binding (although subject to a family court judge's 
review) upon litigants (§439(e) Judiciary Law) and second is 
that Examiners are appointed for three-year terms renewable 
at the discretion of the Chief Administrative Judge. As the 
) 
Director found, however, these differences do not outweigh 
the community of interest and mission which Examiners share 
with other attorneys, including those having quasi-judicial 
functions, in the unit. The record does not disclose 
whether other unit members having quasi-judicial functions, 
such as Law Clerks to Supreme Court Judges and Law 
Assistant-Referees, are deemed to be subject to the Code of 
Judicial Conduct. 
Finally, there is no claim before us that Examiners are 
appropriately excluded from the Act's coverage by virtue of 
•^The Employer has provided factual information to the 
Director concerning the duties of the position and ethics 
opinions, but has announced that it takes no position with 
respect to the petitions, although it has cross-excepted, as 
indicated, supra, to certain factual findings made by the 
Director. 
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managerial or confidential duties. Accordingly, there being 
no dispute that Examiners are public employees within the 
meaning of the Act, their coverage is required unless the 
opinion of the Advisory Committee on Judicial Ethics compels 
their exclusion from coverage. 
It is our determination that, notwithstanding the 
Advisory Opinion which finds that Examiners are subject to 
the requirements of Canon 7 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, 
and notwithstanding its determination that membership in an 
employee organization which has a political organization 
component may violate Canon 7, the Director's decision must 
be reversed. This is so because the scope of this Board's 
authority is to administer and enforce the Act. Having 
found that the Examiners are public employees who are not 
statutorily excluded from coverage by the Act, we must 
conclude that they are indeed covered. It is not for us to 
decide whether these employees should, as a matter of public 
policy or judicial ethics, be excluded from coverage, but 
whether the Act extinguishes the collective bargaining 
rights which they otherwise have thereunder. 
The remaining issue before us is whether, by virtue of 
the Advisory Committee Opinion, exclusion of Examiners from 
the existing units, otherwise appropriate to them, is 
Board - C-3276 - C-3284 -6 
warranted.-^/ To so find would require us to make a uniting 
decision, not on the community of interest of titles in the 
unit, but on the nature and activities of the employee 
organization now representing the unit. Such a 
consideration is not included among the criteria contained 
in §2 07.1 of the Act for the making of uniting decisions. 
5/ 
The Director's decision is accordingly reversed and the 
-^/The Director made reference to employee preferences 
with respect to their placement in the units sought by the 
petitioner. Employee preference is not, however, a factor 
in the determination whether employees are subject to the 
Act's coverage and unit placement. Additionally, the 
Director gave weight to potential professional discipline 
for examiners in reaching his decision. We note, however, 
that many bargaining unit members are members of licensed 
professions who could be targeted for discipline and 
censure, under various codes of professional responsibility, 
as well as the Code of Judicial Conduct. Administrative Law 
Judges and other quasi-judicial officers in bargaining units 
have, for example, been deemed to be covered, at least in 
part, by the Code of Judicial Conduct. See, e.g. New York 
Public Interest Research Group, Inc. v. Williams, 133 Misc. 
2d 116, 506 N.Y.S. 2d 509 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1986). 
-5-/ Section 207.1 of the Act establishes the standards to be 
considered in determining appropriate units. These 
standards relate to the composition of the units and not to 
the bargaining agents for the units, and are listed as 
follows: 
§207.1 (a) the definition of the unit shall correspond 
to a community of interest among the employees to 
be included in the unit; 
(b) the officials of government at the level of 
the unit shall have the power to agree, or to make 
effective recommendations to other administrative 
authority or the legislative body with respect to, 
the terms and conditions of employment upon which 
the employees desire to negotiate; and 
(c) the unit shall be compatible with the joint 
responsibilities of the public employer and public 
employees to serve the public. 
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petitions are remanded for further proceedings not 
inconsistent herewith. 
DATED: April 26, 1989 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member •, / 
#3A-4/26,/8§-
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
CASE NO. C-3409 




NEW YORK STATE FEDERATION OF POLICE, INC., 
Intervenor. 
) CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the New York State Federation of 
Police, Inc. has been designated and selected by a majority of 
the employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit 
agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
-and-
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Unit: Included: Accountant (SH), Account Clerk (SH), Chief 
Court Attendant, Clerk (SH), Correction 
Corporal, Correction Officer, Correction 
Officer - Building Maintenance Mechanic, 
Correction Officer - Building Maintenance 
Supervisor, Correction Officer - Cook, 
Correction Officer - Cook Manager, Correction 
Sergeant, Court Attendant, Deputy Sheriff, 
=——-—- --- — -—-Deputy^ 
Sergeant, Education Program Coordinator, Inmate 
Activities Coordinator, Principal Account Clerk 
(SH), Registered Professional Nurse (SH), 
Senior Account Clerk (SH), Senior Account 
Clerk-Typist (SH), Senior Building Maintenance 
Mechanic, Senior Stenographer (SH), Senior 
Typist (SH), Sheriff Aide, Stenographer (SH), 
Supervisor of Nurses (SH), Typist (SH) . 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the New York State Federation 
of Police, Inc. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the 
mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good 
faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or 
any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written 
agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by 
either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to 
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: April 26, 1989 
Albany, New York 
^m^^ /£* ^L tU^Z*-**/<z^+-
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
/u+tcuf. 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Memb 
#3B-4/26/39 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
HAUPPAUGE SCHOOL UNIT, SUFFOLK EDUCATIONAL 





UNITED INDUSTRY WORKERS, LOCAL 424, 
HAUPPAUGE CUSTODIAL WORKERS, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Industry Workers, 
Local 424, Hauppauge Custodial Workers has been designated and 
selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named public 
employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
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below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of 
collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: Custodian, Guards/Driver Messenger, Custodial 
Worker II, Warehouseworker, Asst. Head 
Custodian MS, Head Custodian - elementary, 
grounds/maintenance, maintenance man, Painter, 
=Storekeeper7=Head=Custodian=MS7^HS^=Eead= 
Maintenance, Head Grounds, Chief Custodian HS, 
Head Maintenance, Head Driver, Bus Drivers, 
Cafeteria Monitors, Hall Monitors, Security and 
Lead Security. 
Excluded: All managerial and confidential titles and all 
other titles. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the United Industry Workers, 
Local 424, Hauppauge Custodial Workers. The duty to negotiate 
collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable 
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of 
an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the 
execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement 
reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not 
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making 
of a concession. 
DATED: April 26, 1989 
Albany, New York 
' Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
r. 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Me: 
#3C-4/26i/89 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ROCKLAND BOCES, NEA, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3469 
BOARD OF COOPERATIVE EDUCATIONAL 
SERVICES OF ROCKLAND COUNTY, 
Employer, 
-and-
BOARD OF COOPERATIVE EDUCATIONAL 
SERVICES STAFF ASSOCIATION, NYSUT, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Board of Cooperative 
Educational Services Staff Association, NYSUT has been designated 
and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named 
public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and 
described below, as their exclusive representative for the 
Certification - C-3469 
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purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Unit: Included: Professional employees, Teaching Assistants, 
Teacher Aides, Senior Occupational Therapists, 
Occupational Therapists, Senior Physical 
Therapists, Physical Therapists, Physical 
_„_ ____-_-._.:_T1_.__,._..„ _^=4Therapist=Assistants^rovided=said==per^sons^=ar^= 
licensed, Occupational Therapist Assistants. 
Excluded: Supervisors and Administrators of the BOCES in 
teaching and related activities, Adult 
Education and all others. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Board of Cooperative 
Educational Services Staff Association, NYSUT. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at 
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, 
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation 
does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require 
the making of a concession. 
DATED: April 26, 1989 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
CU<MJZ~ *?. 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
//3D-4/26/89 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
) PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
WHEATLAND-CHILI EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, 
NYSUT, AFT, 
Petitioner-, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3458 
WHEATLAND-CHILI CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
-and-
WHEATLAND-CHILI NON-TEACHING ASSOCIATION, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees1 Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Wheatland-Chili Education 
Association, NYSUT, AFT has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
Certification C-3458 
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exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: Clerical personnel, school nurses, and aides, 
teacher aides, clerk typists, school aides, 
telephone operator, payroll clerk and 
registered nurse, who are employed ten (10) or 
••=^^=^=^=L-zz^=r -"^mor^^oiTths^per=year^======== = = — = 
Excluded: All other employees employed by the District. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Wheatland-Chili Education 
Association, NYSUT, AFT. The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution 
of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a 
concession. 
DATED: April 26, 1989 
Albany, New York 
^ w ^ g /<? M^ U^i/~Hi^ £L~i* 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
X^^u 2^  
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NISSEQUOGUE VILLAGE POLICE ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3444 
INCORPORATED VILLAGE OF NISSEQUOGUE, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Nissequogue Village Police 
Association has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed 
upon by the parties and described below, as the representative of 
the employees in such unit who are members!/ of the Nissequogue 
Village Police Association for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Because of the absence of agreement to "exclusivity" by the 
Incorporated Village of Nissequogue, the right of 
representation is on a members only basis. 
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Unit: Included: All full-time police officers. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Nissequogue Village Police 
Ass oeiFat±on^^The=duty-to~negotl^te= 
mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good 
faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or 
any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written 
agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by 
either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to 
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: April 26, 1989 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, MembeX 
#3F-4/26/89 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
STATE OF NEW YORK, 
Employer/Petitioner, 
SECURITY UNIT EMPLOYEES, COUNCIL 82, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Security Unit Employees, 
Council 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, has been designated and selected by 
a majority of the employees of the above-named public employer in 
the Security Supervisors Unit as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Security Unit Employees, 
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Council 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
-a~greeme7itf=or=^any~question^^ari^ihg^thereunder^aia-the executioir 
of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a 
concession. 
DATED: April 26, 1989 
Albany, New York 
<3th*ejpJ?j&-. 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
£—. ^--
Walter L. Eisenberg, Membe 
